The United States Should Be Looking Upward, E-ward, & Downward, Instead, Our Congress is Looking at October 1st

The United States should be looking upward, e-ward, & downward to protect our nation’s security, instead

Congress is looking to October 1st. As Congress marches to heroically and dramatically solve their self

inflicted budget crisis with a bandit kit, our nation’s security demands more. Nord Stream, Stuxnet, the ROKS

CHEONAN – these events propelled the United States, and the rest of the world into the new age of Scalable

Ambiguous Precise (SAP) Deterrence. This deterrence is, and will be, the fulcrum of our national security, so it

is time for our nation’s leaders to understand it.

Scalable Ambiguous Precise (SAP) Deterrence is the capability of a country, or non-state actor, to conduct, or

have the credible capability to conduct, an operation that significantly impacts a society in a domain in which

veritable proof of responsibility is nearly impossible to obtain. The domain itself allows

for the ambiguity, the sophistication, expertise, and capability of the actor provides the precision and scalability,

and the deterrent effect hinges on both the threat of use and the potential impact. The domains of Space, Cyber,

and Undersea naturally lend themselves to this concept based on physics and infrastructure. Establishing

absolute proof of responsibility, especially in the unclassified and information-cluttered arena of public opinion,

is nearly impossible; and therefore, so is proportional accountability and retribution.

So, in this precarious security environment, will Congress pass a budget to “provide for the common Defence

and general Welfare of the United States” by September 30th? Do not hold your breath. This century has

witnessed more World Series won by the Chicago Cubs (1) than regular order budgets passed by Congress (0).

Unfortunately, Congress’ decision to not do their job does not just lead to great Cub’s trivia, it directly degrades

our national security and emboldens our adversaries. As our Congress “debates” our nation’s monthly

allowance via Tweets, President Xi and President Putin are toasting one another and closing the capability gap

in critical areas.

In our rapidly changing world, rapidly changing in both reality and the perception of reality, three of the most

critical areas to our national security that the United States cannot afford to come in 2nd are in the domains of

Space, Cyber, and Undersea.

Thirteen years ago, 46 sailors died when the South Korean navy ship, ROKS CHEONAN, sunk in the Yellow

Sea. A torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine was the “most likely” cause. The United States has a

Mutual Defense Agreement with South Korea. We, the United States, or South Korea, did not proportionally

respond to the North Korean attack. The ambiguity associated with what caused the sinking prevented -- or

allowed -- the South Korean government to take no decisive action in response. The ambiguity around the

tragic event remains.

Having personally walked under the recovered and partially-reconstructed ROKS CHEONAN in a South

Korean shipyard, it is crystal clear to me what sunk the CHEONAN and killed 46 sailors. However, despite the

evidence, only around 50% of South Koreans believe, or want to believe, that a North Korean torpedo was the

reason the CHEONAN sank. Whether this is wishful thinking by South Koreans in an effort to preserve the

relative peace on the peninsula or the result of misinformation campaigns, the plausible deniability inherent in

the undersea domain enables this ambiguous outcome.

The good, the bad, and the unknown of Scalable Ambiguous Precise Deterrence -- deterrence based on

perceived capability and plausible deniability that is present in the evolving warfighting domains of Space,

Cyber, and Undersea. The United States must both confront today’s dangers today, but also wisely address

opportunities for tomorrow’s security. A war with China or Russia is not going to be decided by tanks on a

battlefield in Ukraine, Taiwan, or New Jersey, or even by an aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific. The next

Great Powers conflict will be determined, and hopefully deterred, in the Space, Cyber, and Undersea domains.

The ambiguity these domains allow for provide the flexibility for SAP Deterrence to be both a good and a bad

thing. We are at the beginning of this new era, but we are clearly in it. Let us examine the Nord Stream

pipeline attack, or accident, or sabotage. As a 20-year U.S. Submariner with extensive operational experience

and a professional understanding of undersea capabilities, I have my thoughts on what might have occurred.

But as of today, it is unknown what happened and who did it, and no one has been held accountable. So here it

is, the good and the bad. If the Nord Stream physical terminal in Lubmin, Germany, was attacked by Russian

missiles, or the physical terminal in Vyborg, Russia, was attacked by NATO jets, we would be in World War III

with Russia. For better, and for worse, as a result of the plausible deniability for potential actors intrinsic in

undersea operations, no one has been held accountable for the Nord Stream attacks and no one has been held

accountable for the Nord Stream attacks. Clearly, it is a blessing that we are not engaged in World War III, and

at the same time concerning that a potential bad-actor has not been held accountable for an act of war.

Of course, clandestine and covert operations are not a new development in warfare and national security

operations. What is new is the incredible magnitude and society altering impacts to millions of people that can

be potentially conducted through operations in the Undersea, Cyber, and Space domains. Today, is it possible

that operations in these three domains could take down the energy grid in Minneapolis, shut down Global

Positioning System (GPS) over the Pacific Ocean, cut trans-Atlantic communications lines or stop the flow of

natural gas to Germany?

The era of Scalable Ambiguous Precise (SAP) Deterrence does not diminish the role of Nuclear Deterrence, the

two coexist. Differing from Nuclear Deterrence, the “scalability” and “ambiguity” factor of SAP Deterrence

does provide more off-ramps for an escalating crisis but also provides more on-ramps to develop a crisis. The

outcome of the deterrence mechanism failing shifts from one of Mutually Assured Destruction to one of

Mutually Assured Chaos. Chaos will indeed lead to human suffering and severe consequences, but would still

be preferred to the incredible tragedy of nuclear destruction. The best way to ensure Scalable Ambiguous

Precise Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence bring about a safer and more secure future for our children is to

ensure America, once again, has the biggest stick. Let us all hope our “leaders” in DC find a touch of

thoughtful pragmatism to guide their actions and their votes to pass a budget that will “provide for the common

Defence and general Welfare of the United States”.

The best wars are the ones that never happen. Deterrence, like all military operations, works best with

overwhelming advantage. United States Senators and Representatives, for once, rise to the occasion and look

upward, e-ward, and downward to guide wise decisions for our future and that of our children.

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Tom Weiler - 20-year career as a Submarine Officer, completed multiple submarine deployments across the

INDO-PACIFIC, Aircraft Carrier deployment to the Middle East, as well as tours at the Pentagon, Capitol Hill

(Space & Cyber policies), Pacific Fleet Headquarters, and US European Command. Graduate of Notre Dame,

Harvard, Old Dominion, and National Defense University. Following retirement from the Navy due to a

medical curveball, ran for U.S. Congress in 2022 in Minnesota-03, winning the Republican nomination but

losing in the general election.

Magnetic North